By Ted Caddell

Stakeholders last week approved draft regulations to protect the electric grid from physical threats even as many criticized the rules as rushed and poorly defined.

The draft regulations, drawn up by a North American Electric Reliability Corp. working group of 11, are now being considered by the NERC board. NERC must submit proposed regulations to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in June. FERC has scheduled a technical conference June 10 to discuss “policy issues related to the reliability of the Bulk-Power System” at which the NERC filing is likely to be a centerpiece.

The plan won 82% approval in polling of NERC members last week. Among PJM members, Duke Energy, Exelon, FirstEnergy and Dominion all said they support the draft standards, while AEP voted no.

“Are we being overly reactive?” a stakeholder from AEP asked, according to a summary of feedback to the draft regulations that was compiled by NERC. “Poorly executed, these standards could carry astronomical … costs.”

“We need to spend time to get this right and not rush something through,” a stakeholder from the Nebraska Public Power District wrote. “This expedited standard development has the potential to derail our entire NERC standard development process.”

The regulations are in response to concerns resulting from the sabotage of a PG&E Corp. substation last year. Under pressure from Congress, FERC on March 7 ordered NERC to develop standards to address physical attacks within 90 days. (See FERC Orders Rules on Grid’s Physical Security.)

Critical Substations

The NERC draft calls for utilities to provide protection for “critical” substations, but it allows each utility to determine what substations are critical. The rules call for third-party review of critical facilities but would allow utilities to act as each other’s third party. (See related story, NERC Draft Rules for Physical Security.)

The draft rules don’t require hardening critical substation sites with blast barriers or other defenses, as some critics have suggested.

Several stakeholders were critical of the short time FERC gave NERC to comply. Others said the standards should apply not just to transmission owners and operators but also to transmission planners, reliability coordinators and generation owners and operators.

Still others said the standards were too loosely defined. “As described, the objective of protecting critical facilities of the [Bulk Electric System] is stated too broadly and it is not apparent what countermeasures would be considered adequate or sufficient,” wrote the Bonneville Power Administration.

Brightline Criteria

Colorado Springs Utilities recommended a “brightline criteria” for the facilities covered by the standards, “based on either the Transmission Planning Standard TPL-004a [System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements] or identification of the largest single contingency for each interconnection. If we need a single number, [include] only facilities that provide or control over 3,000 MW of generation or transmission operating at 300 kV and above.”

AEP also questioned the proposed definition of critical facilities. “FERC and NERC have implied that the number of critical facilities identified in this process will be relatively small — fewer than 100 of the 55,000 transmission stations dispersed throughout the country. However, for previous `critical asset’ determinations requested by NERC, AEP has already identified almost that many just on our own system. This would indicate we are starting over with the definition of critical facilities, which is counter-intuitive if not counter-productive.”

One member, from the Southwest Power Pool, noted that NERC’s existing definition of Critical Assets is scheduled to be retired in 2016. “How does one then determine the list of ‘critical’ facilities if that definition no longer exists?” that member said.

Several stakeholders referred to a 2013 FERC power flow analysis on the 30 most critical substations nationwide. The analysis, which was leaked to The Wall Street Journal in March, reportedly concluded that the Eastern and Western Interconnections and ERCOT could be shut down for weeks or months if only nine of the substations were sabotaged.

“If a list of the most critical substations exists, why are we trying to develop a new process to determine the list?” a stakeholder from the Nebraska Public Power District asked. “I feel we have been blindfolded and put into a room and told to hit a small target with a dart and we don’t even know which wall or direction to throw the dart.”

Cost Concerns

AEP echoed concerns about the cost of the rules. The new standards, AEP wrote, “could result in massive changes, bringing excessive additional costs with no guarantee of desired outcomes … While we need to make whatever investment is necessary to adequately protect the grid, we also need to be responsible stewards of the grid and our ratepayers’ pocket books.”

In response to criticism of the draft rules cited in a Journal article April 17, NERC issued a statement defending the regulations and the process used to develop them.

“Standards are one piece of this complex, dynamic endeavor of providing a comprehensive approach to reliability,” NERC said. “NERC also has various other tools to fulfill this mission, including guidelines, training, assessments and alerts. This multi-pronged approach has resulted in a secure and reliable bulk power system for North America.”